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NOT EVERYONE IS SCREAMING FOR ICE 
CREAM: HOW MARCHAND V. BARNHILL 
IMPOSES A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO MONITOR 
Jenifer Pickle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most challenging questions in corporate law is 
determining the extent to which the board of directors must monitor 
the corporation.1 To run a corporation properly, directors must uphold 
their fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders.2 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, a board of directors must 
demonstrate good faith efforts to implement and monitor a system of 
oversight by having such a system in place, and to continually monitor 
and update that system.3 Historically, plaintiffs have struggled to 
succeed in bringing claims against a board of directors based on a 
failure to monitor.4 However, the 2019 case of Marchand v. Barnhill5 
has arguably created a new era, one in which plaintiffs can more easily 
succeed in bringing a failure to monitor claim. In Marchand, a 
shareholder of Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. brought a derivative 
suit against the board of directors following a listeria 
outbreak.6 Unlike previous duty to monitor cases, the court held that 
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 1. Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2010) (stating 
that in corporate law, it is difficult to determine whether the board of directors has a duty to prevent 
harm to the corporation). 
 2. JOSEPH D. ZAMORE ET AL., 1 BUSINESS TORTS § 2.01 (rev. ed. 2020). 
 3. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 4. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019); Stone, 911 A.2d at 372; In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); Cydney Posner, Delaware Supreme Court 
Allows Caremark Duty of Loyalty Claims Against Directors to Survive Dismissal Action, COOLEY 
PUBCO (July 12, 2019), https://cooleypubco.com/2019/07/12/delaware-marchand-v-barnhill/. 
 5. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 805. 
 6. Id. at 805. 
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the plaintiffs succeeded in alleging facts that support a reasonable 
inference that the board failed their duty to monitor.7 The decision in 
Marchand reinterprets the duty to monitor and creates a much stricter 
standard for highly regulated industries, such as food and drug 
companies. 
This Comment examines the effects of Marchand and how 
Delaware courts will approach duty to monitor claims in the future. 
Part II considers the pre-Marchand framework of the board of 
directors’ duty to monitor by examining the various standards 
developed by Delaware courts in the past. Part III discusses the facts 
of Marchand and examines the court’s holding and its reasoning. Part 
IV argues that the court’s decision in Marchand has made it easier for 
shareholder derivative suits to succeed in alleging claims based on the 
board’s failure to monitor by examining the effects that Marchand has 
had on recent litigation. Lastly, Part V analyzes the public policy 
impact of Marchand for highly regulated industries and how to 
navigate the duty to monitor following Marchand, especially during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR 
Under corporate law, the board of directors is subject to the 
fiduciary duties of (1) care and (2) loyalty.8 A board’s duty of care 
requires directors to act in a manner that it reasonably believes to be 
in the best interest of the corporation.9 A board may be held liable for 
breaching its duty of care if it were to make an uninformed, unadvised 
judgment that is not reasonably in the best interest of the corporation.10 
In comparison, the duty of loyalty requires the board to (1) protect the 
corporation’s interests and (2) refrain from causing harm to the 
corporation.11 Directors breach their duty of loyalty when they “fail to 
act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for their responsibilities.”12 However, in the 
absence of a conflict of interest, the courts often apply a business 
 
 7. Id. at 824. 
 8. Peter A. Atkins et al., Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Back to Delaware Law Basics, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 10, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/10 
/directors-fiduciary-duties-back-to-delaware-law-basics/; ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2. 
 9. Atkins, supra note 8; ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2. 
 10. ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
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judgment rule, which presumes that the board of directors acted on an 
informed basis in good faith and in the best interest of the company.13 
Thus, courts have long refrained from holding directors liable for 
harmful consequences that do not involve wrongful or illegal acts.14 
Some scholars argue that by applying the business judgment rule, 
courts have encouraged directors to be unaware of aggressive risk-
taking by officers.15 In breaching their fiduciary duties, the directors 
could cause shareholders to suffer detrimental losses.16 
While there is not a separate duty of good faith, some Delaware 
courts impute such a duty in cases where numerous red flags have 
arisen, finding a failure to monitor to be a breach of the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty.17 To hold a director liable for failure to provide an adequate 
system of oversight, the directors must have “utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls” or 
“having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”18 The most 
important issue related to the duty to monitor is the standard of care 
that must be taken by the board to detect potential harm.19 Imposing a 
strict standard could cause a board to become risk-averse and cause 
the company to overinvest in monitoring systems.20 Additionally, the 
board could reject risky business decisions to prevent liability.21 For 
this reason, past decisions from the Delaware courts have made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to succeed in duty to monitor 
cases.22 
 
 13. ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2. 
 14. Pan, supra note 1, at 718; see generally In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that the purpose of the business judgment rule is 
“to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being 
held personally liable if those decisions turn out poorly”). 
 15. Pan, supra note 1, at 718. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Pan, supra note 1, at 720. 
 20. Ronald J. Daniels, Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects of 
Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance, 24 CAN. BUS. 
L.J. 229, 233 (1995) (discussing how directors may “be induced to operate the company in an 
excessively risk averse fashion” to avoid liability); Pan, supra note 1, at 720. 
 21. See Daniels, supra note 20, at 234; Pan, supra note 1, at 720. 
 22. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing the duty to 
monitor claims as the “most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope 
to win a judgment”); see also Pan, supra note 1, at 720 (discussing how Delaware courts have 
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Over the past 60 years, Delaware courts have interpreted and 
expanded upon the standard required to succeed in bringing a failure 
to monitor claim.23 The three seminal Delaware cases establishing the 
duty to monitor are Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,24 In re Caremark 
International,25 and Stone v. Ritter.26 The landmark case was Graham, 
which held that directors are not liable for failing to enact a 
compliance program unless suspicious circumstances have been 
brought to its attention that make the board aware of illegal or 
wrongful activity.27 Thirty-three years later, the court expanded on 
Graham through its decision in Caremark.28 The opinion of 
Chancellor William Allen in Caremark remains the most 
comprehensive examination of the meaning of duty to monitor, 
leading these lawsuits to be referred to as “Caremark claims.”29 The 
Caremark decision required directors to be informed and vigilant, so 
that they may implement an information and reporting system even 
before the occurrence of red flags.30 Only ten years later, in Stone v. 
Ritter, the court expanded on the decision in Caremark.31 In Stone, 
Justice Holland stated that to recover in an oversight case, the plaintiff 
must show a lack of good faith on the part of the directors.32 A more 
detailed examination of these three cases helps to understand the 
modern standard applied today. 
A.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
In 1963, Graham was the first case in Delaware to acknowledge 
a board’s duty to oversee compliance and preclude corporate 
misconduct.33 In Graham, the plaintiffs filed a derivative suit on 
 
limited the scope of the duty to monitor due to “the chilling effect that the threat of legal liability 
may have on a board’s business judgment”). 
 23. See, e.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 362; Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 126 
(Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 959. 
 24. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 25. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 26. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 27. Graham, 188 A.2d at 129. 
 28. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 959. 
 29. See, e.g., Pan, supra note 1, at 722–23. 
 30. See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 31. Stone, 911 A.2d at 362. 
 32. Id. at 372. 
 33. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963); see also Paul E. 
McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647, 651 (2018) 
(discussing how the “fiduciary duty to oversee legal compliance” was first addressed in Graham); 
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behalf of Allis-Chalmers against the company’s directors for failing to 
stop employees from violating federal antitrust laws.34 Allis-Chalmers 
was an electrical equipment manufacturer, whose company was 
divided into multiple divisions and departments within those 
divisions.35 The company’s business model was designed to 
decentralize the delegation of authority by giving responsibilities to 
the lowest management level capable of fulfilling the tasks.36 For this 
reason, the department manager generally priced products, without the 
participation of the directors.37 Instead, the board of directors would 
meet once a month to consider general financial and operating data.38 
During these meetings, the board would not consider specific issues 
related to the various divisions or the departments within those 
divisions.39 
Multiple indictments charged Allis-Chalmers with violations of 
anti-trust laws by engaging with other manufacturers and employees 
to fix prices and interfere with bids to both private and governmental 
agencies.40 While there was no evidence that the directors had actual 
knowledge of the illegal anti-trust activity, the plaintiffs claimed that 
prior decrees from the Federal Trade Commission in 1937 put the 
directors on notice of their duty to ensure that future anti-trust activity 
would not occur.41 However, none of the directors currently employed 
by Allis-Chalmers were directors or officers in 1937.42 Thus, the court 
held that the 1937 decrees did not put the directors on notice of the 
possibility of future anti-trust activity.43 
The plaintiffs further argued that the directors were liable for the 
losses suffered by Allis-Chalmers based on their duty to actively 
supervise and manage the corporate affairs, and that they should have 
known of the employees’ illegal conduct.44 However, the court did not 
agree with this argument either, and held directors are bound to use 
 
Pan, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that Graham was the first case to recognize a board’s duty to 
prevent corporate misconduct). 
 34. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127. 
 35. Id. at 128. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 129. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 129–30. 
 44. Id. at 130. 
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the same care that an ordinarily prudent individual would use in 
similar circumstances.45 The court held that “failure to exercise proper 
control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular 
case.”46 Further, the court stated that “directors are entitled to rely on 
the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs 
to put them on suspicion that something is wrong.”47 If the directors 
are suspicious of misconduct and fail to take action, they could be 
liable; however, in this case, the directors could not possibly have 
known all of the employees’ misconduct based on the company’s 
decentralized system of decision making.48 Instead, the directors 
decided company policy based on summaries, reports, and corporate 
records.49 The court holds that this system was proper and is distinct 
from cases in which directors recklessly rely on an obviously 
untrustworthy employee, negligently perform their duties, or ignore 
obvious signs of employee misconduct.50 In those situations, the court 
held that the directors will be liable for the corporation’s losses based 
on a neglect of duty, but none occurred here.51 According to the court 
in Graham, this board acted promptly to end misconduct and prevent 
its recurrence, once it became aware of the employees’ actions.52 
Thus, the court held that the individual directors were not liable merely 
because they were unaware of the fact that some employees of Allis-
Chalmers violated anti-trust laws and caused the corporation losses.53 
Following Graham, directors had no duty to install and operate 
an oversight system absent cause for suspicion.54 In acknowledging 
the duty to monitor, the court in Graham made two distinct points. 
First, the court categorized the duty to monitor as falling within the 
board’s duty of care.55 The duty of care arises from a board’s control 
over the management of a corporation and in Graham, the court 
specifically characterizes the board’s duty to monitor as “those of 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 131. 
 54. Id. at 130–31. 
 55. Id. at 130. 
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control.”56 Second, the court defined the duty to monitor as a passive 
duty, in which boards were only liable if they ignored obvious red 
flags indicating wrongdoing.57 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
gave boards very little incentive to monitor. Delaware courts 
continued to follow the standard created in Graham for the next thirty-
three years, until the court expanded upon the duty to monitor in 
Caremark. 
B.  In re Caremark International 
Chancellor William Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark 
International provides one of the most expansive considerations of the 
duty to monitor.58 Caremark International, Inc. (“Caremark”) was a 
Delaware corporation, whose main revenue came from alternative site 
health care and managed care services, including growth hormone 
therapy, hemophilia therapy, and prescription drug programs.59 A 
significant portion of Caremark’s revenue was obtained from third-
party payments and insurance programs, including both Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursements.60 Some of these payments were regulated 
by the Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL), which is enforced by the 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of 
Justice.61 The ARPL prohibits health care providers from making any 
payments to encourage referrals of Medicare or Medicaid patients.62 
Despite the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ attempt to 
clarify the scope of the ARPL, there was much uncertainty about the 
law due to a lack of court decisions interpreting the statute.63 Caremark 
entered into contracts with various physicians and health care 
providers in exchange for services, who in turn recommended 
Caremark’s services or products to patients.64 However, to ensure that 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Pan, supra note 1, at 722–23 (referring to Chancellor William Allen’s opinion in 
In re Caremark International as the “most complete exploration by a Delaware court of the meaning 
of the duty to monitor”). 
 59. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; see generally A Roadmap for New Physicians, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/intro.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) 
(providing additional background on the Anti-Referral Payments Law and additional federal laws 
regarding Medicare/Medicaid referrals). 
 62. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 961–62. 
 63. Id. at 962. 
 64. Id. 
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Caremark was not violating the ARPL, Caremark followed an internal 
“Guide to Contractual Relationships” (the “Guide”), which was 
initially created by Caremark’s predecessor in 1989, and was reviewed 
and updated by Caremark’s lawyers annually.65 Each version of the 
Guide established the policy that no payments would be made to 
physicians and hospitals in exchange for the physicians inducing 
patient referrals.66 
Between 1991 and 1992, the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Department of Justice launched an investigation into 
Caremark.67 This investigation attempted to uncover the extent to 
which Caremark paid physicians for monitoring patients under their 
care and making patient referrals.68 During this investigation, 
Caremark claimed that it attempted to increase supervision over 
branch operations and took additional steps to assure compliance with 
the ARPL.69 As a result of this investigation, Caremark published 
revised versions of its Guide and designed an internal audit plan to 
enforce business and ethics policies.70 
In August 1994, a Minnesota federal grand jury charged 
Caremark, two of its officers, a sales employee, and a physician with 
violating the ARPL.71 The indictment alleged Caremark had paid the 
physician over $1.1 million to induce him to prescribe one of the 
company’s human growth hormone drugs to his patients.72 In response 
to this claim and the ongoing investigation, five separate stockholders 
filed derivative suits on behalf of Caremark against the board of 
directors.73 These actions, which the court consolidated, alleged “that 
Caremark’s directors breached their duty of care by failing adequately 
to supervise the conduct of Caremark employees, or institute 
corrective measures, thereby exposing Caremark to fines and 
liability.”74 Subsequently, in September of 1994, an Ohio federal 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; see generally Milt Freudenheim, Caremark Is Indicted in Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/05/business/company-news-caremark-is-
indicted-in-kickbacks.html (discussing the investigation of Caremark). 
 68. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 962; see generally Freudenheim, supra note 67 
(discussing the investigation of Caremark). 
 69. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 963. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 963–64. 
 72. Id. at 964. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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grand jury issued an additional indictment, claiming that an Ohio 
physician had received $134,600 in exchange for referrals of patients, 
in violation of the ARPL.75 One month later, the shareholder 
derivative suit amended the complaint to include the Ohio 
indictment.76 
In January 1995, Caremark terminated any remaining financial 
relationships with physicians related to Caremark’s business of home 
infusion, hemophilia, and growth hormones.77 A few months later, 
Caremark began settlement negotiations with the federal and state 
agencies that had been investigating Caremark’s wrongdoing.78 As a 
result of these negotiations, Caremark offered to make payments of 
approximately $250 million to both private and public parties.79 
In 1996, the Court of Chancery of Delaware considered whether 
to approve a proposed settlement of a consolidated derivative action 
on behalf of Caremark.80 However, in approving the settlement, 
Chancellor William Allen took the opportunity to examine the duty to 
monitor.81 The shareholders claimed that Caremark’s directors 
“allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed the 
corporation to enormous legal liability and that in so doing they 
violated a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.”82 The 
court in Caremark expressed that this is the most difficult claim for a 
plaintiff to succeed upon.83 
A director’s liability for failure to monitor may arise from (1) a 
board decision that was “ill-advised or ‘negligent’” or (2) “an 
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due 
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”84 When 
considering director liability, courts will apply the business judgment 
rule.85 The business judgment rule holds that a director has not 
breached the duty to monitor if the board exercised a good faith effort 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 965. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 960–61. 
 80. Id. at 966. 
 81. Id. at 967. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 85. Id. at 967–68. 
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to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment.86 According to 
the Caremark court, plaintiffs would have to show (1) the directors 
knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring; (2) 
the directors failed to make any good faith efforts to prevent or remedy 
the situation; and (3) such failure proximately resulted in financial 
losses to the corporation.87 According to the court, a director could be 
held liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal 
standards if they fail to assure that adequate corporate information and 
reporting systems exist.88 
 In Caremark, Chancellor Allen recognized the benefits 
shareholders could receive from a heightened duty to monitor and took 
care to ensure that the scope of his opinion was not too broad.89 The 
court made certain that the test of liability for directors—a lack of 
good faith—was quite high.90 Directors would not be required to 
possess detailed information about every aspect of the corporation, as 
“such a requirement would simple [sic] be inconsistent with the scale 
and scope of efficient organization size in this technological age.”91 If 
directors were not aware of the specific activities that led to the 
corporation’s losses, they could not be liable.92 
Through the court’s opinion, Chancellor William Allen created a 
stricter monitoring standard than was applied in Graham, by extending 
the board’s liability to situations where they “should have known that 
violations of law were occurring.”93 This standard is broader than that 
of Graham, where directors were only liable for neglecting obvious 
red flags. In cases prior to Caremark, Delaware courts viewed the 
board as being uninvolved in the day-to-day operations of the 
corporation.94 However, in Caremark, Chancellor Allen recognized 
that “ordinary business decisions that are made by officers and 
employees deeper in the interior of the organization can, however, 
vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability to achieve 
its various strategic and financial goals.”95 Thus, after Caremark, 
 
 86. Id. at 968. 
 87. Id. at 971. 
 88. Id. at 970. 
 89. Id. at 971. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Pan, supra note 1, at 726. 
 95. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 968. 
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Delaware courts created a stricter obligation on boards, by requiring 
directors “to act in good faith to assure the board was receiving 
sufficient information to oversee operations.”96 Despite this, it was 
still difficult for plaintiffs to succeed upon a Caremark claim, as the 
plaintiff still had to prove that the board failed to provide reasonable 
oversight in a continuous and systematic manner.97 While the standard 
in Caremark gave much more insight than the previous case of 
Graham, there was still a lack of clarity around the board’s duty to 
monitor, leading to the court’s analysis in Stone v. Ritter ten years 
later. 
C.  Stone v. Ritter 
In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court was presented with the 
opportunity to reexamine Caremark’s duty to monitor standard.98 In 
Stone, the plaintiffs brought a derivative complaint against the 
directors of AmSouth Bancorporation (“AmSouth”).99 AmSouth was 
a Delaware corporation, whose wholly-owned subsidiary, AmSouth 
Bank, operated commercial banking branches throughout the 
southeastern United States.100 “In 2004, AmSouth and AmSouth Bank 
paid $40 million in fines and $10 million in civil penalties” in response 
to government and regulatory investigations, which concluded bank 
employees failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) 
required by federal anti-money-laundering regulations.101 In October, 
the Federal Reserve and Alabama Banking Department required 
AmSouth to improve its Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) compliance program and to hire an independent 
consultant “to conduct a comprehensive review of the Bank’s AML 
compliance program and make recommendations, as appropriate, for 
new policies and procedures to be implemented by the Bank.”102 
Additionally, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) 
 
 96. Michael Furey, Del. Caremark Opinion Shows Shift in Deference to Boards, LAW360 
(July 23, 2020, 5:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1292332/del-caremark-opinion-
shows-shift-in-deference-to-boards. 
 97. Pan, supra note 1, at 723. 
 98. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006). 
 99. Id. at 365. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 366. 
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found that AmSouth’s compliance program “lacked adequate board 
and management oversight.”103 
The plaintiff shareholders filed a derivative suit, alleging a classic 
Caremark claim.104 Plaintiffs specifically claimed that the directors 
“utterly failed to implement any sort of statutorily required 
monitoring, reporting or information controls that would have enabled 
them to learn of problems requiring their attention.”105 Here, the court 
discussed how the failure to act in good faith may lead to liability, as 
it is a fundamental condition of the duty of loyalty.106 The court 
applied the Caremark standard, and held that the necessary conditions 
for director oversight liability are that the board: (1) “utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls” or (2) 
“having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”107 According 
to a report from an independent consultant, AmSouth’s board had 
dedicated numerous resources to the BSA/AML compliance program 
and put multiple systems into place to ensure compliance with these 
regulations.108 These systems established a reporting procedure and 
allowed directors to periodically monitor AmSouth’s compliance with 
the necessary regulations.109 Therefore, the court held that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish facts to satisfy the high burden of the 
Caremark standard.110 
In Stone, the court redefined the duty to monitor as a failure of 
good faith, which they determined was a subsidiary element of the 
duty of loyalty.111 This was inherently different than the court’s 
opinion in Graham and Caremark, where both courts considered the 
duty to monitor to be part of the duty of care.112 The standard from 
Stone created three challenges for plaintiffs: (1) plaintiffs must show 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 364. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 369–70. 
 107. Id. at 370. 
 108. Id. at 371. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 373. 
 111. Id. at 370; Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty 
of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1769–70 (2007); Pan, supra note 1, at 727. 
 112. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, 
698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 111. 
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scienter by proving that the board acted with “conscious disregard for 
their responsibilities,” (2) the board is responsible only for preventing 
wrong or illegal acts, and (3) the board cannot be held liable for failing 
to keep up with the outcomes of previous board decisions.113 However, 
the most significant change was that post-Stone, oversight liability 
required an element of scienter, requiring plaintiffs to prove that 
directors not only breached their duty to monitor but did so 
knowingly.114 
III.  MARCHAND V. BARNHILL 
These three Delaware court decisions have resulted in making it 
close to impossible for plaintiffs to succeed in finding boards liable 
for failure to monitor. However, in 2019, plaintiffs were given a ray 
of hope with the court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill.115 The issue 
in Marchand surrounded Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (“Blue 
Bell”), a Delaware corporation and one of the largest manufacturers 
of ice cream in the nation.116 Blue Bell operates in a heavily regulated 
food industry, which is primarily governed by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).117 Blue Bell must comply with all regulations 
and establish controls to monitor for and avoid contamination.118 The 
FDA has strict guidelines, which require food manufacturers like Blue 
Bell to conduct operations with adequate sanitation principles and 
institute a written food safety plan, which includes a food hazard 
analysis and implements preventative controls.119 In addition to 
federal regulations, Blue Bell must also adhere to various state 
regulations in each of the three states that it operates in—Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Alabama.120 
Between 2009 and 2013, Blue Bell repeatedly failed to comply 
with the required regulations.121 FDA inspections in Texas discovered 
leaking pipes, ripped and open containers of ingredients, and 
 
 113. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369, 370; Pan, supra note 1, at 719–20; Louis J. Bevilacqua, Monitoring 
the Duty to Monitor, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 28, 2011). 
 114. See Bevilacqua, supra note 113 (stating that by adding an element of scienter, “Stone made 
it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to show that directors breached their duty”). 
 115. 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
 116. Id. at 807, 809. 
 117. Id. at 810. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 810–11. 
 121. Id. at 811–12. 
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employees failing to wear gloves or wash their hands, in violation of 
FDA standards.122 Additionally, in 2010 and 2011 the Alabama 
Department of Health found equipment left on the floor, standing 
water, open lids, and unprotected measuring cups, in violation of 
Alabama regulations and FDA standards.123 And, an inspection of the 
facility in Oklahoma further revealed a failure to manufacture foods 
under sanitary conditions and a failure to handle equipment in a way 
that protects against contamination, in violation of FDA standards.124 
In addition to the FDA’s inspections, Blue Bell also conducted internal 
investigations of their Oklahoma facility.125 According to the 
complaint, these internal examinations found “presumptively positive 
tests [of listeria] dating back to 2013.”126 Later, in 2014, a third-party 
laboratory found two positive reports of listeria in the Oklahoma 
facility.127 
Despite management’s knowledge of the listeria findings, the 
complaint alleges that the “information never made its way to the 
board, and the board continued to be uninformed about (and thus 
unaware of) the problem.”128 The board’s meetings in early 2014 
showed no discussion of the listeria reports or the findings of the FDA 
inspections, which is further evidence that the board did not know of 
the listeria reports.129 Throughout the remainder of 2014, the 
Oklahoma facility continued positive findings of listeria.130 Ironically, 
board minutes from the September 2014 meeting stated that recent 
third-party audits for sanitation issues “went well.”131 
The next year showed no improvements for Blue Bell.132 Positive 
coliform levels were found in the Oklahoma facility during January 
2015, and one month later, Blue Bell received notification of positive 
 
 122. Id. at 811. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see generally BLUE BELL CREAMERIES, LP, ESTABLISHMENT INSPECTION REPORT 2 
(Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Blue-Bell-Creameries--LP--
Broken-Arrow--OK--EIR-dated-3-28-12.pdf (discussing the FDA’s findings at the Oklahoma 
facility). 
 125. Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316, at *12–13 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
 126. Id. at *13. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 812. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 812–13. 
 132. Id. at 813. 
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listeria tests at the Texas plant from the Texas Department of State 
Health Services.133 Interestingly, the Blue Bell board of directors did 
not discuss any issues of listeria during their meeting on February 19, 
2015.134 However, four days later Blue Bell initiated a limited recall, 
likely in response to the findings by the Texas Department of State 
Health Services.135 Two days later, on February 25, 2019, the board 
met and discussed how the FDA was working with the Texas health 
inspectors to investigate the recall.136 This was the first time that the 
board’s discussion of listeria was reported in the minutes, despite the 
overwhelming evidence that the contamination was occurring.137 By 
March 13, 2015, the FDA, CDC, and Bluebell had all issued public 
recall notifications.138 However, listeria cases continued to rise and 
resulted in the deaths of three adults from Kansas.139 These 
overwhelming implications forced Blue Bell’s chief executive officer, 
advertising and public relations manager, and vice president for sales 
and marketing to meet in April 2015.140 During this meeting, the 
executives decided to expand the recall to all of Blue Bell’s products 
and shut down all of its production operations.141 In total, the listeria 
outbreak caused by Blue Bell’s products infected ten people across 
four states: Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.142 
Following the full product recall, the FDA reinspected all three of 
the company’s plants.143 The investigation did not fare well for Blue 
Bell.144 At the Texas facility, the FDA found a “‘failure to manufacture 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 813–14. 
 137. Id. 
 138. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Pub. Affs., Blue Bell Creameries Agrees to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $19.35 Million for Ice Cream Listeria Contamination—Former Company President Charged 
(May 1, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/blue-bell-creameries-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-
1935-million-ice-cream-listeria. 
 139. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell 
Creameries Products (Final Update), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (June 10, 2015, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/ice-cream-03-15/index.html. 
 140. Rachel Abrams & Hiroko Tabuchi, For Blue Bell, a Drastic Move to Recall Ice Cream as 
Listeria Findings Rose, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/busin
ess/listeria-leads-to-major-ice-cream-recall.html. 
 141. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 316, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
 142. Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell Creameries Products, supra note 
139. 
 143. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814. 
 144. Id. 
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foods under conditions and controls necessary to minimize the 
potential for growth of microorganisms,’ inadequate cleaning and 
sanitizing procedures, ‘failure to maintain buildings in repair 
sufficient to prevent food from coming adulterated,’ and improper 
construction of the building that failed to prevent condensation from 
occurring.”145 In Oklahoma, the FDA found that listeria tests had been 
showing positive results for the past three years, and there was a failure 
to manufacture and package foods in a way to minimize the potential 
for contamination.146 While the conditions of the Alabama plant were 
not as severe as Texas and Oklahoma, the FDA continued to find 
contamination and failure to perform necessary testing to identify 
possible food contamination.147 
Following the company’s recall and listeria outbreak, a Blue Bell 
shareholder requested the company’s books and records.148 The 
shareholder then filed a derivative suit, claiming that the board failed 
to inform itself of Blue Bell’s food safety compliance and failed to 
respond appropriately to the growing food safety issues.149 The 
complaint alleged multiple facts that are relevant to this issue: (1) there 
was no board committee in place that addressed food safety; (2) Blue 
Bell had no regular process or protocols that required management to 
notify the board or keep them apprised of food safety compliance 
practices, risks, or reports; (3) the board did not have a schedule to 
consider any key food safety risks existed; (4) board minutes show 
that management did not disclose any cautionary or red flags to the 
board leading up to the unfortunate deaths of three customers; (5) 
management reported favorable information about food safety to the 
board, but the board was not shown any unfavorable reports or FDA 
findings; and (6) the minutes from board meetings were lacking any 
suggestion that there was regular discussion of food safety issues.150 
The complaint also alleged that the issues the FDA found could have 
been cured if management had relayed the information to the board on 
an ongoing basis.151 Initially, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted 
Blue Bell’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff failed to plead 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 815. 
 148. Id. at 815–16. 
 149. Id. at 816. 
 150. Id. at 822. 
 151. Id. 
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any facts to support “his contention that the [Blue Bell] Board ‘utterly’ 
failed to adopt or implement any reporting and compliance 
systems.”152 The Court of Chancery reasoned that the plaintiff did not 
challenge the existence of a monitoring system, “but the effectiveness 
of monitoring and reporting controls in particular instances,” which is 
“not a valid theory under . . . Caremark.”153 The shareholder plaintiffs 
appealed, and in June 2019, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued its 
opinion and reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision.154 
The Supreme Court of Delaware applied the rule from Caremark, 
which requires a director to make a good faith effort to implement an 
oversight system and monitor it.155 The court recognized that directors 
have the discretion to approach business and industry-specific 
approaches, but the directors must still meet the bottom-line 
requirement to make a good faith effort to implement a reasonable 
system of monitoring and reporting.156 Prior case law has given great 
deference to a company’s board of directors and made the Caremark 
claim standard difficult—if not impossible—to meet.157 If the facts 
can show that the directors have “a relevant committee, a regular 
protocol requiring board-level reports about the relevant risks, or the 
board’s use of third-party monitors, auditors, or consultants,” it is 
unlikely that the court will hold in favor of the plaintiff.158 
However, the court held that the plaintiff in Marchand did meet 
the difficult Caremark standard.159 If a “plaintiff can plead an 
inference that a board has undertaken no efforts to make sure it is 
informed of a compliance issue intrinsically critical to the company’s 
business operation, then that supports an inference that the board has 
not made the good faith effort that Caremark requires.”160 In defense, 
the directors of Blue Bell emphasized the fact that manuals were in 
place discussing safety practices and third-party audits were 
 
 152. Id. at 808 (quoting Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316, 
at *41 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)). 
 153. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821 (omission in original) (quoting Marchand, 2018 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 316, at *41). 
 154. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 808. 
 155. Id. at 820–21. 
 156. Id. at 821. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 823. 
 159. Id. at 824. 
 160. Id. at 822. 
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commissioned occasionally.161 However, the court stressed that 
simple compliance with FDA regulation and the fact that management 
received results of government inspections is not enough to meet the 
requirements to implement “a system to monitor food safety at the 
board level.”162 Blue Bell directors also emphasized that management 
communicated with them regularly regarding “operational issues.”163 
Again, the court did not agree with this argument.164 Food safety is 
essential to Blue Bell’s operation, and the facts that the plaintiff pled 
support a fair inference that there was no system of food safety 
monitoring or reporting at the board-level.165 Additionally, the court 
noted that “as a monoline company that makes a single product—ice 
cream—Blue Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products 
and were confident that its products were safe to eat.”166 Here, the 
board’s lack of efforts not only resulted in a lack of “compliance,” but 
also resulted in the deaths and illness of Blue Bell’s customers.167 For 
this reason, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of 
Chancery’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.168 The 
Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs succeeded in alleging 
“particularized facts that support a reasonable inference that the Blue 
Bell board failed to implement any system to monitor Blue Bell’s food 
safety performance or compliance.”169 Thus, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with their opinion.170 
IV.  THE CURRENT DUTY TO MONITOR STANDARD 
A.  The Marchand Standard 
Generally, it is quite difficult for a plaintiff to plead a Caremark 
claim and ultimately prove liability based on a board’s failure to 
monitor.171 According to Chief Justice Strine, writing in Marchand, a 
Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation 
 
 161. Id. at 822–23. 
 162. Id. at 823. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 823–24. 
 165. Id. at 824. 
 166. Id. at 809. 
 167. Id. at 814. 
 168. Id. at 808. 
 169. Id. at 809. 
 170. Id. at 824. 
 171. See, e.g., id.; In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); Posner, supra 
note 4. 
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law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”172 
Marchand arguably lowers the heightened standard that plaintiffs 
previously had to plead under Caremark and Stone. In doing this, 
Marchand gives new life to duty to monitor claims. 
Prior to Marchand, Caremark claims were typically dismissed in 
early pleading stages, even before discovery.173 It was difficult for 
plaintiffs to reach the high standard required by Caremark and Stone, 
as they would have to prove that that the board utterly failed “to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists.”174 Marchand expands on the court’s previous interpretations 
and explains that compliance with regulations is not enough. In the 
Marchand opinion, Justice Strine clarifies that Blue Bell’s compliance 
with applicable regulations “does not foreclose any pleading-stage 
inference that the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of 
bad faith indifference required to state a Caremark claim.”175 The 
court’s decision in Marchand warns directors to be proactive when 
creating a proper compliance program and conducting risk 
oversight.176 For companies in the food industry, like Blue Bell, 
nominal compliance with FDA regulations is simply not enough.177 
Instead, after Marchand, companies may be more likely to face 
liability if they fail to “make a good faith effort to implement an 
oversight system and then monitor it.”178 
B.  Post-Marchand Litigation 
Following Marchand, the Delaware courts released two 
subsequent decisions allowing both Caremark claims to survive 
motions to dismiss.179 By analyzing the Caremark claims that were 
brought post-Marchand, we can better understand what the current 
duty to monitor standard is. In Section IV.B.1, I will discuss the case 
 
 172. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 173. Holly J. Gregory et al., Board Oversight in Light of COVID-19 and Recent Delaware 
Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harva
rd.edu/2020/05/26/board-oversight-in-light-of-covid-19-and-recent-delaware-decisions/. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823. 
 176. Posner, supra note 4. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821. 
 179. See In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 1293, at *38 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 162, at *54 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
(10) 54.4_PICKLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:40 PM 
1284 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1265 
of In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation,180 and its 
similarity to Marchand. In Section IV.B.2, I will discuss Hughes v. 
Hu,181 and contrast how the duty to monitor standard may be applied 
differently depending on what industry the company is involved in and 
what regulations it must comply with. 
1.  In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. 
Just a few months after Marchand, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery found a Caremark claim sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc.182 Clovis Oncology, Inc. 
(“Clovis”) is a biopharmaceutical company, who was in the process of 
developing a lung cancer drug, Rociletinib (“Roci”).183 During this 
time, Clovis had no pharmaceutical products on the market, and Roci 
was the most promising among the drugs in development.184 As part 
of the development process for Roci, Clovis conducted a clinical trial 
to test the safety and efficacy of the drug.185 The clinical trial was 
supposed to be based on the protocol that Clovis had submitted to the 
FDA.186 However, Clovis did not adhere to the protocol and included 
unconfirmed responses from trial participants, even though the FDA 
could only approve Roci based on confirmed responses.187 By 
incorporating unconfirmed responses, the biopharmaceutical 
company miscalculated drug performance metrics and even failed to 
account for the drug’s side effects.188 In doing such, Clovis reported 
inflated success rates to the public.189 Eventually, Clovis disclosed to 
the public that Roci was much less successful than was previously 
reported, which caused Clovis’ stock to drop 70%.190 Further, Clovis 
was forced to stop the clinical development of the drug in May 2016, 
 
 180. 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293. 
 181. 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162. 
 182. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *4. 
 183. Id. at *2; see generally Adam Slutsky et al., Caremark Round II: Beware Red Flags in 
Drug Development, GOODWIN (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2019/1
0/10_08-caremark-round-ii-beware-red-flags (discussing additional background regarding the 
drug, “Roci”). 
 184. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *5. 
 185. Id. at *9. 
 186. Id. at *9–10. 
 187. Id. at *12. 
 188. Id. at *18–19. 
 189. Id. at *12. 
 190. Id. at *17. 
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following the FDA’s refusal to approve it.191 Clovis’ failure to adhere 
to proper clinical trial protocol resulted in investigations by the FDA 
and the SEC, and a shareholder derivative lawsuit.192 
In this derivative suit, the plaintiffs claimed that the board of 
directors for Clovis ignored red flags indicating the company was not 
adhering to FDA protocols in clinical trials for its new drug.193 While 
the Marchand court found the board liable on the first prong of 
Caremark,194 the court in Clovis held that the first prong of Caremark 
was satisfied based on the fact that the Clovis board had tasked its 
nominating and corporate governance committee with providing 
oversight of federal health care and FDA requirements.195 Instead, the 
court found that the board was liable under the second prong of 
Caremark because they consciously failed to monitor the system of 
controls that they implemented.196 
The court characterized Clovis as a company operating in a highly 
regulated industry, where compliance with protocols is critical.197 The 
Clovis board failed to address the unconfirmed reports, even though 
they had enough experience in the pharmaceutical industry to 
understand the risks of violating FDA protocols and procedures.198 
Thus, the monetary and reputational harm to Clovis stems from the 
company’s “mission critical failure” to comply with the protocol and 
related FDA regulations.199 The court noted that Caremark liability is 
more likely to attach when the alleged oversight failure concerns 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at *21. 
 193. Id. at *22; see generally Stephanie C. Evans & Alan J. Wilson, Another Reminder from 
Delaware About the Duty of Oversight, WILMERHALE (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.c
om/sitecore/content/Shared-Data/Blogs/Focus-on-Audit-Committees-Accounting-and-the-
Law/2019/10/28/20191028-Another-Reminder-from-Delaware-About-the-Duty-of-Oversight 
(providing additional background on the facts of Clovis). 
 194. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019). Following Caremark, courts have 
held that a plaintiff can show director liability on one of two prongs: (1) the directors failed to 
implement an adequate monitoring system or (2) having implemented a system, the board failed to 
properly monitor it. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see Evans & Wilson, supra 
note 193 (discussing how the plaintiffs in Marchand successfully pleaded facts that show Blue Bell 
failed to implement any monitoring system). 
 195. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *29. 
 196. Id. at *32. 
 197. Id. at *30–31. 
 198. See id. at *6–8; see also Gardner Davis & John Wolfel, Delaware Court Permits Caremark 
Claim Against Clovis Oncology Board, 34 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. (2019) (discussing how the 
board was “comprised of experienced biopharmaceutical executives, medical researchers[,] and 
health care-focused venture capitalists”). 
 199. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *32. 
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“compliance with positive law,”200 as opposed to the managing of 
business risk.201 For these reasons, the court allowed the plaintiff’s 
Caremark claim to survive a motion to dismiss.202 
The most significant shift between the standard applied in 
Caremark and Stone and the standard applied in Marchand and Clovis 
is the judicial emphasis placed on board monitoring of businesses 
operating in highly regulated industries. While Caremark and Stone 
were focused on business decisions that harmed the company, the 
failure to adequately monitor food and drug industries could create 
significant harm to the general public. 
Although Blue Bell Creameries operated in the food industry and 
Clovis operated in the pharmaceutical industry, the companies’ 
business models were very similar. Both Blue Bell and Clovis 
operated with a monoline business model.203 “As ice cream was to 
Blue Bell Creameries, Clovis’ Rociletinib (‘Roci’) drug candidate to 
treat lung cancer was Clovis’ mission critical product.”204 Although 
Roci was not the only drug that Clovis was developing, it was the only 
one that was “especially promising.”205 Additionally, both companies 
in Marchand and Clovis were regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration, whose mission is to protect public health “by ensuring 
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, 
biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety 
of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit 
radiation.”206 Although the line between food and pharmaceutical 
industries is sometimes blurred, there is one important factor that they 
 
 200. Id. at *27. When using the phrase “positive law,” the Chancery Court of Delaware explains 
that this includes regulatory mandates. Id. The Court is likely using the phrase “positive law” to 
describe statutes and laws from regulatory authorities, such as the FDA and SEC. See id. 
 201. Id. at *27 (stating that “it is appropriate to distinguish the board’s oversight of the 
company’s management of business risk that is inherent in its business plan from the board’s 
oversight of the company’s compliance with positive law”) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis & 
Wolfel, supra note 198 (discussing how the court in Clovis suggested that Delaware courts are 
more likely to find Caremark oversight liability if the company is regulated by positive laws). 
 202. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *32. 
 203. See id. at *3; Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019); see also Evans & 
Wilson, supra note 193 (comparing Blue Bell’s monoline business model to the model used by 
Clovis). 
 204. Evans & Wilson, supra note 193; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *31. 
 205. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *2. 
 206. What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last updated Mar. 28, 
2018). 
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have in common—a need for public safety.207 Here, Clovis chose to 
disregard one of Roci’s significant side effects, QT prolongation, 
which carries a risk of sudden cardiac death.208 Thus, if Clovis had 
succeeded in distributing Roci, multiple consumers could have been 
put at risk for severe illness or even death. 
When considering the oversight of food and drug companies, 
boards must be more risk-averse, as the public’s health and safety are 
at risk. The Clovis court cites Marchand repeatedly, and states that 
“when a company operates in an environment where externally 
imposed regulations govern its ‘mission critical’ operations, the 
board’s oversight function must be more rigorously exercised.”209 The 
court’s opinion in Clovis, “signals that, post-Marchand, the Delaware 
courts, in assessing Caremark claims at the pleading stage, may hold 
boards operating in highly regulated industries to a somewhat elevated 
standard for monitoring and assessing compliance with mission-
critical regulatory regimes.”210 For these reasons, Marchand and 
Clovis demonstrate a significant emphasis on the importance of the 
duty to monitor to protect public health and safety. 
2.  Hughes v. Hu 
As of April 2020, another Caremark claim survived a motion to 
dismiss in the case of Hughes v. Hu.211 Hughes involves a Caremark 
claim against the audit committee and several executives of Kandi 
Technologies Group, Inc. (“Kandi”).212 Kandi is a publicly-traded 
 
 207. Sometimes it can be difficult to differentiate between foods and drugs; for example, 
caffeine can be considered as both a food when found in caffeine drinks, or a drug when ingested 
in pill form. However, both food and drugs can cause significant harm, such as obesity, overdose, 
or even death. Matthew J. Edlund, Is That a Food or a Drug?: What’s Really Inside that Food You 
Just Ate?, PSYCH. TODAY (May 5, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-power-
rest/201105/is-food-or-drug. 
 208. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *18–20; see 
Wesley T. O’Neal, et al., Association Between QT-Interval Components and Sudden Cardiac 
Death, CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY (2017), https://www.ahajournals.o
rg/doi/10.1161/CIRCEP.117.005485. 
 209. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *28 (quoting 
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (stating “food safety was essential and 
mission critical”)). 
 210. John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, In re Clovis: Considering Caremark Claims 
After Marchand, 33 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Nov. 2019, at 36, 38. 
 211. See Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
2020); Cydney Posner, Another Caremark Claim Survives Dismissal, COOLEY PUBCO (May 12, 
2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/05/12/caremark-claim-survives-dismissal/. 
 212. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1. 
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Delaware company based in China that sells parts for the 
manufacturing of electric vehicles.213 Kandi had faced financial 
reporting issues in the past, dating back to 2010.214 In particular, the 
company had numerous issues with properly reporting related-party 
transactions.215 Although these material weaknesses were publicly 
announced in 2014, no remedial actions were taken.216 
In March 2017, Kandi disclosed in its 10-K that three years of 
financial statements were to be restated and that it lacked sufficient 
expertise related to GAAP, SEC disclosure requirements, and 
effective financial controls.217 Following this, plaintiff shareholders 
commenced litigation on Kandi’s behalf, alleging the directors who 
comprised the audit committee failed to establish a board-level system 
of oversight, which led to the March 2017 restatement that caused the 
Company severe harm.218 The complaint identified numerous issues 
including (1) internal audits were reported directly to the CEO, not to 
the audit committee; (2) the audit committee met only once a year for 
no more than an hour; (3) Kandi’s outside auditor was sanctioned by 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for improperly 
handling 2010, 2011, and 2012 audits; and (4) a lack of policies or 
procedures mentioned in the company’s minutes.219 While the 
company did have an audit committee and internal audit department, 
the Hughes court compared these directors to those in Marchand, who 
failed to make good faith efforts to reasonably monitor at the board-
level.220 The court even went as far as to say that the board’s “pattern 
of behavior indicates that they followed management blindly, even 
after management had demonstrated an inability to report accurately 
about related-party transactions.”221 Thus, although Kandi had an 
audit committee, the Court of Chancery found that these directors 
 
 213. Id. at *5–6; Posner, supra note 211. 
 214. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1; Posner, supra note 211. 
 215. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1. 
 216. Id. at *1–2. 
 217. Id. at *2 (stating that the Company “lacked[] sufficient expertise relating to technical 
knowledge of US GAAP requirements and SEC disclosure regulations; [s]ufficient expertise to 
ensure the completeness of the disclosure of financial statements for equity investments; [s]ufficient 
expertise to ensure the proper disclosure of related-party transactions . . . [and s]ufficient expertise 
to ensure the accuracy of the accounting and reporting of income taxes and related disclosures”). 
 218. Id. at *3. 
 219. Id. at *11, *20, *26, *49. 
 220. Id. at *47. 
 221. Id. at *48. 
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faced a substantial likelihood of liability under Caremark, and denied 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.222 
It may be tempting to claim that Hughes follows the trend of 
Marchand and In re Clovis, but Hughes is significantly distinct.223 The 
main distinction from Marchand and In re Clovis is that the 
misconduct in Hughes did not involve any public health or public 
interest issues.224 Unlike Clovis and Blue Bell, Kandi did not operate 
a single-product business and was not in the food or pharmaceutical 
industries. Kandi’s products were not of any issue in the case, which 
further distinguishes it from the previous cases. Instead, the issue here 
was that Kandi’s board failed to properly monitor the company’s 
financial reporting. 
It can be argued that the facts of Hughes are more similar to the 
facts of Stone, in which the plaintiffs brought forth allegations based 
on the company’s failure to comply with financial reporting 
regulations. Similar to the company in Stone, Kandi’s actions were 
regulated by the SEC. Unlike the FDA, the SEC’s mission is to 
“protect investors by vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws 
to hold wrongdoers accountable and deter future misconduct.”225 
Therefore, the purpose of the SEC’s regulations is starkly different 
from the public health concerns of the FDA, as the SEC is concerned 
about financial misconduct, not physical harm. Thus, while it could be 
argued that Hughes follows the trend of Marchand and Clovis, it is 
more likely that the “particularly egregious” actions of the audit 
committee allowed the Caremark claim to move past the pleading 
stages.226 
Although Hughes does not follow the public interest trend of 
Marchand and Clovis, the case is significant because it shows how a 
board may be held liable even if they have an audit committee in place. 
While Kandi did have an audit committee in place, it only met when 
 
 222. Id. at *54; see generally Nicholas D. Mozal & David A. Seal, Three Is Not a Trend: 
Another Caremark Claim Survives a Motion to Dismiss, but Does Not Reflect a Change in the Law, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/202
0/05/27/three-is-not-a-trend-another-caremark-claim-survives-a-motion-to-dismiss-but-does-not-
reflect-a-change-in-the-law/ (providing further background on the misconduct of the audit 
committee). 
 223. Mozal & Seal, supra note 222. 
 224. Id.; Furey, supra note 96. 
 225. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do (last 
visited April 11, 2021). 
 226. Mozal & Seal, supra note 222. 
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federal securities law required it to meet, which was not often enough 
considering the material weaknesses in the company’s internal 
controls.227 The court also noted that the duration of the audit 
committee meetings was too short, and there was “no possible way 
that the Audit Committee could have fulfilled all of the responsibilities 
it was given under the Audit Committee Charter during a fifty-minute 
meeting.”228 Additionally, Kandi claimed that they had retained an 
independent, outside auditor; however, this auditor’s sole client was 
Kandi, which put into question whether the auditor was truly 
independent.229 Thus the court claimed that the audit committee was 
liable for Kandi’s “pervasive problems with its internal controls” due 
to the committee meeting sporadically, not devoting adequate time to 
its work, and “consciously turned a blind eye to their continuation.”230 
While the actions of the audit committee in Hughes are egregious and 
likely not analogous to a majority of audit committees, it is important 
for boards to be reminded of the significance of meeting regularly and 
effectively addressing irregularities to avoid liability.231 
V.  HOW TO NAVIGATE COMPLIANCE FOLLOWING MARCHAND 
When navigating the duty to monitor, boards must consider not 
only case law but also federal regulations and current societal issues. 
The following part will consider these factors and address the 
necessary steps that boards should take moving forward to avoid 
liability. In Section V.A, I will consider how Marchand and 
subsequent litigation has impacted directors’ assessment of their 
monitoring systems. Further, in Section V.B, I will examine the 
influence that federal guidance has on boards’ duty to monitor. Lastly, 
in Section V.C, I will consider the significant impacts of COVID-19, 
and how the pandemic will affect the duty to monitor. 
A.  Impacts of Case Law on Boards’ Next Steps 
After Marchand, Clovis, and Hughes, companies are likely left 
questioning their compliance programs and wondering what a proper 
oversight system should consist of. Some corporate attorneys do not 
 
 227. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *48; Mozal & Seal, supra note 222. 
 228. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *16. 
 229. Id. at *45; Mozal & Seal, supra note 222. 
 230. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *41–42. 
 231. Mozal & Seal, supra note 222. 
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view Marchand as a shift in Delaware law, but instead, see the 
decision as a caution to directors to actively engage in proper 
oversight.232 However, others fear that Marchand creates a significant 
shift in Delaware law, which could cause corporations to face 
increased costs and efforts to implement a proper oversight 
program.233 By requiring a more stringent oversight system for 
corporations in highly regulated industries, the corporation will have 
to face the costs of both designing and implementing its compliance 
program.234 However, it is imperative that courts impose the stricter 
Marchand standard when deciding whether plaintiffs can bring forth 
a Caremark claim to protect consumers’ health and safety. While the 
costs of the compliance program may be high, these costs are minimal 
compared to the financial and reputational harm that a company may 
face, along with the negative health risks that its consumers may be 
impacted by.235 
One of the significant lessons of Marchand is that corporate 
minutes and other forms of documentation should be created to reflect 
the board’s oversight efforts.236 These documents should reflect the 
company’s reporting protocols, compliance with regulations, and any 
actions taken to overcome business risks.237 In Marchand, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated that when a plaintiff can establish a 
board has failed to take any efforts to make sure it is properly informed 
of compliance issues, then “that supports an inference that the board 
has not made the good faith effort that Caremark requires.”238 For this 
reason, boards should regularly review, on either a quarterly or semi-
annual basis, the effectiveness of their compliance efforts through 
third-party audits.239 Additionally, corporations must guarantee that 
any compliance program contains clear direction about maintaining 
and transferring any compliance responsibilities in the case of 
 
 232. See David A. Katz & Laura McIntosh, Oversight and Compliance Reminder, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/01/ove
rsight-and-compliance-reminder/. 
 233. See Posner, supra note 4. 
 234. RICHARD W. BLACKBURN & JEFFREY J. BINDER, 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 47:8 (rev. ed. 2020). 
 235. See id. 
 236. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019). 
 239. Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CRIM. DIV. (June 
2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download; Katz & McIntosh, 
supra note 232. 
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employee turnover.240 For example, if a corporation’s vice president 
of human resources becomes the new chief financial officer, the 
corporation must take care to transfer any compliance responsibilities 
and ensure that the oversight system maintains continuity and 
consistency.241 
To expand oversight efforts, boards can also utilize committees 
to review and keep records of the board’s risk management.242 While 
not required, audit committees and risk management committees 
could ensure that proper documentation is kept by consistently 
reviewing board minutes and materials.243 However, the audit 
committee must have the proper expertise and devote adequate time 
to monitoring, so that they do not suffer the same fate as the directors 
in Hughes.244 While there is no strict rule regarding proper expertise, 
courts will likely consider whether the committee has industry-related 
knowledge or previous experience, either through education or career 
choices, how long the committee members have been involved in the 
industry, and how they have handled risk management issues in the 
past.245 Additionally, any documentation that is kept by committees, 
or the board itself, should be detailed and include specific language.246 
While privileged information should not be disclosed, these 
 
 240. BLACKBURN & BINDER, supra note 234. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
2020) (stating that the Company “lacked[ s]ufficient expertise relating to technical knowledge of 
US GAAP requirements and SEC disclosure regulations; [s]ufficient expertise to ensure the 
completeness of the disclosure of financial statements for equity investments; [s]ufficient expertise 
to ensure the proper disclosure of related-party transactions . . . [and s]ufficient expertise to ensure 
the accuracy of the accounting and reporting of income taxes and related disclosures”). 
 245. See In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 1293, at *5–8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (discussing the defendants’ length of time on the 
board, experience in the relevant industry, prior careers, and history serving on other boards); see 
also Nicholas J. Price, The Best Practices for Board Education, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (June 27, 
2018), https://insights.diligent.com/board-education/the-best-practices-for-board-education 
(discussing how board directors should seek out continuing education that will help them 
understand how to “leverage the corporation’s potential, manage data and information, mitigate 
risks and protect the corporation’s reputation”). 
 246. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232 (stating vague, generalized language is not sufficient 
and lack of detail may be viewed as evidence that the board failed to make a good faith effort 
towards oversight); Mozal & Seal, supra note 222 (discussing how the absence of detailed minutes 
in Hughes led the Delaware Court of Chancery to deny the motion to dismiss). 
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documents should not be drafted so vaguely or generalized as to doubt 
the board’s compliance.247 
B.  Federal Guidance on the Duty to Monitor 
Historically, the duty to monitor has been governed by the 1991 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which created a legal incentive for 
corporations to develop and operate an effective compliance 
system.248 Recently, federal law has been “trending strongly in the 
direction of a robust corporate compliance obligation in many 
disparate fields of regulation,” including antitrust, financial services, 
and healthcare industries.249 Prior to Marchand, the Department of 
Justice released a memorandum in April 2019 providing additional 
guidance on how to navigate corporate compliance.250 This updated 
guidance provides factors that prosecutors should consider when 
determining whether to prosecute or penalize a corporation depending 
on the effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at the 
time of the offense.251 When considering a corporation’s oversight 
system, prosecutors will consider whether the company has made sure 
that the compliance program is understood by company employees 
and whether the compliance program has been continuously improved 
through periodic testing and reviews.252 The DOJ memorandum 
 
 247. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232 (discussing how documents should not contain 
vague, generalized information). 
 248. McGreal, supra note 33, at 647. In 2004, the Sentencing Guidelines were updated to 
address the role of directors with regard to corporate compliance. Id. at 669. The updated Guidelines 
noted that a strong commitment from the board and senior management is critical for the 
compliance program to succeed. Id. at 671. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines created a foundation 
for federal corporate compliance and led the way for future federal involvement, perhaps 
influencing the DOJ’s 2019 Memorandum. See id. at 677–79. 
 249. Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMP. 
L. REV. 727, 728 (2018). 
 250. John Nassikas et al., New DOJ Compliance Program Guide, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (June 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/10/new-doj-compliance-
program-guidance/; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232; Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs, supra note 239. 
 251. Nassikas et al., supra note 250; Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra 
note 239. 
 252. Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra note 239 (stating that “prosecutors 
may reward efforts to promote improvement and sustainability”). In considering audits, the 
prosecutors will analyze how frequently the audits took place, whether they are internal or not, and 
whether the relevant audit findings are regularly reported to the board. Id. Prosecutors assess 
periodic testing by considering how the corporation tests and analyzes compliance data, and how 
the results are reported and tracked. Id. Additionally prosecutors are concerned with how the 
company updates its risk assessments and what steps it takes to determine the best policies and 
practices for the particular business model. Id. 
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suggests that prosecutors will further consider what types of issues 
have been reported to the board, how the board has addressed them, 
and whether documentation of board minutes can show that the board 
has acted diligently in fulfilling their duty to monitor.253 Thus, the DOJ 
memorandum compliments the Marchand decision by emphasizing 
the importance of maintaining an adequate oversight and compliance 
program.254 
C.  Increased Liability from COVID-19 
The risk of shareholder derivative litigation is especially 
heightened during the crisis of COVID-19.255 Attorneys and scholars 
have already predicted an increase in Caremark claims as a result of 
the massive business disruption caused by the unprecedented health 
crisis.256 The COVID-19 pandemic creates a unique circumstance, 
where companies are now being held to additional regulations that 
require social distancing and increased health and safety measures.257 
Similar to Marchand and Clovis, the failure to monitor compliance 
with positive law,258 such as the COVID-19 regulations, makes it more 
likely for plaintiffs to succeed in bringing a Caremark claim.259 While 
companies are additionally facing increased financial litigation in light 
of COVID-19, it will be more likely for a board to be held liable for 
failure to monitor if the corporation’s actions create a public health 
risk, as was seen in Marchand and Clovis.260 For example, if the 
directors of a travel or restaurant company decide to continue normal 
business operations despite social distancing regulations, its 
consumers would be placed at an increased risk to COVID-19 and the 
corporation could be found liable for failing to monitor critical 
conditions.261 Additionally, boards may face liability for their failure 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Scott Crofton et al., How Boards Can Protect Against Covid-19-Related Shareholder 
Claims, CORP. SECRETARY (May 15, 2020), https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/shareho
lders/32102/how-boards-can-protect-against-covid-19-related-shareholder-claims. 
 256. William Savitt et al., Governance Litigation and the COVID-19 Pandemic, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 19, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/19/governa
nce-litigation-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/. 
 257. Crofton et al., supra note 255. 
 258. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
 259. See Crofton et al., supra note 255. 
 260. See Savitt et al., supra note 256. 
 261. See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Here’s What Employers Need to Know About COVID-19 Liability 
Shields, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMNT. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools
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to properly prepare for the pandemic, which could include claims that 
the board failed to take steps to mitigate risks or take proper 
precautionary measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among 
employees or customers.262 While businesses are advocating for 
legislation to protect themselves from COVID-19-related liability, 
very few states have created such protections and there remains no 
protection at the federal level.263 These few state protections are 
extremely limited, and employers must still show that they acted in 
good faith to comply with federal, state, and local guidance.264 
Additionally, it is important to note that a board’s compliance 
with federal and state regulations is not enough.265 When Blue Bell 
argued that it had complied with certain FDA and state regulations, 
the court in Marchand made sure to note that compliance with 
regulations does not imply that the board implemented an adequate 
monitoring system at the board-level.266 The risks of COVID-19 are 
unique to each company’s line of business.267 As companies move 
forward and contemplate reopening, it is vital for boards to 
affirmatively investigate mission-critical compliance risks created by 
COVID-19.268 Corporations should continue to take accurate and 
detailed board minutes, form COVID-19 committees, and consider the 
use of third-party advisors to supplement their compliance efforts.269 
COVID-19 presents multiple red-flag issues that corporations must 
address expeditiously to survive this pandemic and prevent any 




 262. Virginia Milstead, Shareholder Derivative Suits Likely to Extend to COVID-19, Racial 
Equality, SKADDEN (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/09/qu
arterly-insights/shareholder-derivative-suits. 
 263. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 261. In Georgia, recent legislation has created a “rebuttable 
presumption that the plaintiff assumed the risk of exposure, transmission, infection or potential 
exposure to COVID-19, unless the plaintiff is asserting certain claims involving gross negligence, 
willful misconduct[,] or reckless behavior.” Id. Additionally, New Jersey’s law only protects health 
care providers from COVID-19-related liability in order to remove any impediments to providing 
medical treatment. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Crofton et al., supra note 255. 
 266. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 823 (Del. 2019); Crofton et al., supra note 255. 
 267. Nicholas A. Gravante et al., Caremark Precedent Should Inform Boards’ COVID-19 
Duties, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6ffca590-
7598-4450-9f43-85a4d0736872. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Crofton et al., supra note 255. 
(10) 54.4_PICKLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:40 PM 
1296 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1265 
The main goal of a compliance program is to create a system in 
which the board will receive all necessary information regarding 
significant business risks, thereby allowing the board to take 
appropriate action.270 Risk management is a significant issue that 
corporations must learn how to navigate, especially in times where one 
small mistake can cause catastrophic harm not only to the company’s 
business, but also to the public’s health. The Supreme Court of 
Delaware has moved in the right direction with Marchand, and it is 
crucial for companies to strengthen their fiduciary duty to monitor, 
especially during these times. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since the decision of Graham in 1963, Delaware courts have 
come quite a long way in interpreting the duty to monitor. Instead of 
passively responding to red flags, directors must now take initiative to 
actively address and resolve critical risks that could harm the 
corporation.271 While all companies must uphold their fiduciary duty 
to monitor, highly regulated industries are under heightened scrutiny. 
Corporations in the food, beverage, and pharmaceutical industries are 
at a higher risk of facing shareholder derivative suits based on their 
obligation to comply with federal and state regulations and protect 
public health.272 Consumers rely on these companies to provide safe 
and healthy products, and if the board fails to properly monitor 
operations, it could cause their consumers to face significant health 
risks and their company to suffer a loss of business. Hughes also 
showed us that establishing an audit committee is not enough if that 
committee does not have the requisite knowledge and demonstrate 
reasonable efforts to manage risks.273 Marchand has arguably created 
a new era for duty to monitor cases, one in which plaintiffs are more 
likely to succeed in holding directors liable for failure to monitor. 
While commentators fear that Marchand will create risk-averse 
businesses, the heightened liability is necessary to hold boards 
accountable for their actions.274 
 
 270. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232. 
 271. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820–21. 
 272. See id.; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 1293, at *2–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
 273. Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *40–41 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 27, 2020). 
 274. See Daniels, supra note 20. 
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Moving forward, it is crucial for boards to establish risk 
management policies at the board-level. Especially during the current 
COVID-19 pandemic, it is now more important than ever for boards 
to stay vigilant and document their efforts in corporate books and 
records.275 The recent guidance from Marchand will hopefully 
influence boards to take action and prevent future risks that could cost 
them the support of their shareholders and consumers. Overall, the 
Marchand decision has led the duty to monitor in the right direction 
and future Caremark claims involving public interest issues are likely 
to follow the same trend. 
  
 
 275. See Gravante et al., supra note 267. 
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